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With the advent and subsequent growth of several new media technologies, 
violent extremist groups have incorporated social media into recruiting strategies. How 
are violent extremist groups using social media for recruiting? 
This thesis explores several new media technologies—websites, blogs, social 
media, mobile phones, and online gaming—to determine if violent extremist groups rely 
on social media for recruiting. By comparing the communication of al Qaeda and ISIS, 
this thesis concludes that violent extremist groups rely on social media, and they employ 
a wide range of new media technologies to attract and recruit new members. In some 
instances, virtual interaction still requires face-to-face communication to adequately 
recruit someone into a violent extremist group. 
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To remain effective, violent extremist groups must recruit new members 
continuously. Counterterrorism authors Deborah Browne and Andrew Silke argue that 
“whoever communicates the most compelling message significantly improves their 
chances of winning” the battle for hearts and minds of new recruits.1 
Extremist organizations’ recruiting messages are important, but the method and 
mode of communication are equally critical. To maintain an advantage over agencies that 
counter them, violent extremist groups have incorporated social media completely into 
their recruiting repertoire. How are violent extremist groups using social media for 
recruiting? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
Violent extremist groups’ ability to communicate and recruit globally threatens 
U.S. interests and allies. In his Worldwide Threat Assessment to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, identified al 
Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)2 as top threats to the nation. Since 
2011, Clapper said ISIS has recruited over 20,000 foreign fighters—3,400 came from 
Western nations.3 In a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas J. Rasmussen elaborated on 
Clapper’s foreign fighter estimate: he said 150 of the 3,400 Western recruits were 
recruited from the United States.4 
                                                 
1 Deborah Brown and Andrew Silke, “The impact of the media on terrorism and counter-terrorism,” in 
The Psychology of Counter-Terrorism, ed. by Andrew Silke (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 89. 
2 This paper’s author acknowledges the existence of multiple ways of referring to al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). For the purpose of consistency and standardization, ‘al Qaeda’ and 
‘ISIS’ will be the version used throughout this paper. 
3 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, 114th Cong. (26 Feb 15) (statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence): 4-5. 
4 Current Terrorist Threat to the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, 114th Cong. (12 Feb 15), (statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen, National Counterterrorism 
Center Director). 
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Internet access and social media use continues to grow. According to a recent 
study from the Pew Research Center that surveyed 32 countries, 11 countries had a 
majority population that owns computers and accesses the Internet regularly.5 In 
emerging and developing countries, two-thirds of Internet users accessed the Internet 
daily.6 Once online, 82 percent of Internet users regularly used social media as a news 
source or as a way to stay connected and interact regularly with friends and family.7 
New media allows violent extremist groups to actively connect with and recruit 
from vast and globally distributed audiences. This thesis describes how violent extremist 
groups have incorporated several new media technologies—social media, in particular—
into recruiting efforts. Additionally, it illustrates how violent extremist groups have 
adapted their communication structures to utilize social media networks for distributing 
propaganda, biased information used to influence beliefs or behavior. Furthermore, this 
thesis details how violent extremist groups use social media to identify popular topics or 
collect individual preferences. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The amount of academic literature on violent extremist groups’ use of new media, 
the Internet, and social media is expansive; however, literature correlating social media 
usage to recruitment effectiveness is limited. As a result, the amount of empirical data 
proving or disproving extremists’ reliance predominantly on social media for recruiting is 
minimal. 
This literature review covers five main areas. First, it introduces four media 
definitions: new media, Web 2.0, echo chamber, and narrowcasting. Second, it highlights 
new media characteristics that provide advantages over old media, which are beneficial to 
violent extremist groups. Third, it illustrates several new media technologies and social 
                                                 
5 “Internet Seen as Positive Influence on Education but Negative Influence on Morality in Emerging 
and Developing Nations,” Pew Research Center’s Internet, Science & Technology, March 2015: 4-5, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2015/03/Pew-Research-Center-Technology-Report-FINAL-March-19-
20151.pdf. 
6 Ibid., 6. 
7 Ibid. 
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media outlets that violent extremists use for recruiting purposes. And, fourth, it explains 
why online gaming attracts vast numbers of networked gamers. As a result, violent 
extremist groups have developed games to access these large audiences. This section also 
offers a number of counterarguments. They contend that new media and social media are 
equally beneficial to both violent extremist groups and the agencies that attempt to 
neutralize them. 
1. Definitions 
Similar to the definition of terrorism, a consensus definition does not exist for 
“new media.” Bailey Socha and Barbara Eber-Schmid of the New Media Institute 
provided a general definition: “New media is a 21st Century catchall term used to define 
all that is related to the Internet and the interplay between technology, images, and 
sound.”8 
As a distinct difference from old media, several authors discuss the technological 
and distributional aspects of new media. Author Chenoy Ceil notes that new media 
“integrate[s] computers with multimedia,” which allows end-users to traverse the Internet 
freely or choose topics based on personal interests.9 Just as technology continues to 
change, so does the definition of new media.10 For the purpose of this thesis, the Internet 
and passive websites are generally included in new media. 
Beyond simple searches or navigating to websites for information, the Internet has 
evolved into a highly interactive, user-based environment that involves active 
participation. Neil Y. Yen and his co-authors discuss how “Web 2.0” is considered the 
“read-n-write Web, or the Social Web” because it is highly interactive and “prompts 
[users] to participate in creating and publishing information.”11 Additionally, it allows 
users the ability to view, download, and upload audio and video files while commenting 
                                                 
8 Bailey Socha and Barbara Eber-Schmid, “What is New Media?,” New Media Institute, last modified 
2014, http://www.newmedia.org/what-is-new-media.html. 
9 Chenoy Ceil, “The Role of Old Media in New Communication Environment,” 4 June 2011, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1884906. 
10 Socha and Eber-Schmid, “What is New Media?” 
11 Ibid 
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on and communicating with other social media users.12 For the purpose of this thesis, 
Web 2.0 and social media are used interchangeably. 
Once online, the Pew Research Center reports that over 80 percent of Internet 
users maintain and use social media regularly to stay connected and share information.13 
This information is easily accessible to other users. It can be used to tailor media and 
messages toward user preferences or other social media account demographics. Author 
Gabriel Weimann explains that this targeted approach of tailoring propaganda toward a 
specific audience or individual preferences for recruiting purposes is known as 
narrowcasting.14 
In an effort to connect and interact with people of similar interests and feelings, 
Internet users seek various social media groups that exhibit characteristics that are 
congruent with their own. Once established within a group, other members within social 
forums can produce what Peter R. Neumann calls an “echo chamber”—the process of 
amplifying interests and emotions through constant messaging and reinforcement.15 
Within this echo chamber, Neumann says that people develop a “skewed sense of 
reality.”16 Violent extremist groups use the skewed reality that echo chambers create to 
portray terrorism as a normal, desirable act. 
2. New Media 
Before the Internet, the public was forced to rely on mass media to communicate 
with other groups or government officials. Author Brigitte L. Nacos refers to this 
phenomenon as the Triangle of Political Communication.17 In the triangle, mass media 
                                                 
12 Peter R. Neumann, “Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United 
States,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 6 (2013): 434, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2013.784568. 
13 “Internet Seen as Positive Influence,” 6. 
14 Gabriel Weimann, “New Terrorism and New Media,” Wilson Center Common Labs, no. 2 (2014): 
3, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new_terrorism_v3_1.pdf. 
15 Neumann, “Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization,” 437. 
16 Ibid., 436. 
17 Brigitte L. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: the Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007), 15. 
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regulated communication between the public and political leaders. With the advent of the 
Internet and continued advances in technology, new media freed the public from Naco’s 
communication triangle. 
Authors Phillip Seib and Dana M. Janbek agree with Nacos; new media 
technology circumvents the media controls of old media by allowing users the ability to 
create, edit, and distribute media and messages quickly and globally.18 Seib and Janbek 
go on to explain that “communication is at the heart of terrorism” and thereby argue that 
violent extremist groups must maintain a constant flow of new recruits to remain 
effective and sustain ongoing operations.19 With the advent of a more interactive Web 
2.0, they pose that online recruitment has replaced the face-to-face interaction that was 
once required before the advent of new media.20 
For violent extremist groups, framing is a key component to a successful 
propaganda strategy. By portraying acts of terrorisms as deeds committed by jihadis, 
violent extremist groups attempt to frame terrorism as a justifiable act committed by a 
devout Muslim. Seib and Janbek explain that this religious affiliation helps to portray acts 
of terrorism positively, attracts new media users, and potentially entices them to join the 
group or commit terrorism in the name of jihad.21 
By utilizing the Internet, violent extremist groups’ propaganda is highly persistent 
and accessible. The video in which Musab al-Zarqawi decapitated Nicholas Berg was 
posted in May of 2004. Within 24 hours, the video was downloaded over 500,000 times 
and viewed over a million times.22 These downloads and viewings could take place 
quickly because the video was repeatedly posted on a number of different sites. As the 
video was posted, links were distributed widely to the new website locations. As sites 
                                                 
18 Phillip Seib and Dana M. Janbek, Global Terrorism and New Media; The Post-Al Qaeda 
Generation (New York: Routledge, 2011), 17. 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 Ibid., 19. 
21 Ibid., 20. 
22 Ibid., 35. 
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were blocked or removed, new sites would emerge and links were redistributed to the 
video’s new location.23 
In their book New Media, authors Nicholas Gane and David Beer relay two 
important benefits of being online: low relative costs and expansive connectivity.24 Since 
technology allows vast amounts of data to be physically stored or transmitted, user costs 
to store or distribute data goes down significantly. Alternatively, users’ connectivity goes 
up substantially because they are networked with other users over vast geographic areas. 
Gane and Beer provide a concise explanation of reliable, instantaneous 
connectivity and how it pertains to low costs. They said “simultaneous access to 
networked information means distributing the same underlying content or product many 
times over without the difficulties and costs implied by shifting physical products through 
a supply chain.”25 Therefore, distributing information through the Internet is an 
inexpensive way of providing consistent and reliable information. 
From the violent extremist perspective, the Internet offers unfettered access to an 
endless number of global users. Author Gabriel Weimann provides a substantial list of 
advantages the Internet offers extremists: 
• Easy access 
• Little or no regulation, censorship, or other government controls 
• Potentially huge audiences spread around the world 
• Anonymity of communication 
• Fast flow of information 
• Inexpensive development and maintenance of a web presence 
• Multimedia environment (ability to combine texts, graphics, audio, and 
video—allows users to download films, songs, books, posters, etc.) 
                                                 
23 Seib and Janbek, Global Terrorism and New Media; Post-Al Qaeda Generation, 35. 




• Ability to shape coverage in the traditional [old] mass media, which 
increasingly uses the Internet as a source of stories26 
In another of Gabriel Weimann’s works, he says that, “since the late 1980s, the 
Internet has proven to be a fast and efficient platform for the flow of communication, 
reaching an ever-growing worldwide audience.”27 The Internet, therefore, has become a 
communication tool that is vital to violent extremist groups. It allows them to 
communicate over long distances within the group or with others outside of the group—
nonmembers or potential new recruits.28 
Over the span of 20 years, violent extremist groups’ online presence has grown 
from a dozen websites to nearly 10,000.29 At the turn of the century, virtually every 
group had established a presence online. By 2003, the number of known extremist group 
websites had grown to over 2,600. In 2013, the groups and their supporters managed 
more than 9,600 sites online.30 
The Internet offers a diverse and expansive number of new media technologies 
that provide “ease of access, lack of regulation, vast potential audiences, fast flow of 
information,…[and] anonymity,” as Weimann says.31 Since it attracts vast amounts of 
activity and information, the Internet allows violent extremist groups to communicate 
overtly and hide in plain sight.32 
An expansive study from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime supports 
Weimann’s theories. It says that the Internet offers easy access, global reach, and 
anonymity, but it further explains how extremist organizations use the Internet to 
                                                 
26 Gabriel Weimann, Www.Terror.Net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, United States 
Institute of Peace, 2004, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf. 
27 Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace; the Next Generation (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 2015), 18. 
28 Ibid., 4. 
29 Ibid., 10-1. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 21. 
32 Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace; Next Generation, 22. 
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distribute propaganda specifically for the purpose of recruiting new members.33 
Similarly, in his testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, Brian Jenkins 
said that, “terrorists use the Internet to disseminate their ideology, appeal for support, 
spread fear and alarm among their foes, radicalize and recruit new members, provide 
instructions in tactics and weapons” and more.34 But how are they able to scope 
messages for recruiting purposes and create “virtual communities of like-minded 
extremists,” as Jenkins explains?35 
3. Social Media 
To determine the most used social media sites, the Pew Research Center 
conducted a study that found 71 percent of worldwide Internet users have a Facebook 
account, which is the highest used social media site on the Internet. After Facebook, users 
preferred LinkedIn, Pinterest, Instagram, and Twitter.36 In addition to social media site 
preferences, the Center also conducted a separate study to determine why users joined 
social media networks and the types of information users shared. 
Over 70 percent of social media users share information about music and movie 
preferences, 56 percent publicize sports interests, and 37 percent recommend or discuss 
products they use.37 Social media is also a main source of news and politics for members. 
Therefore, within social media networks, users can determine political and religious 
preferences or general likes and dislikes of others within their network based on the 
information shared.38 
Catherine Theohary and John Rollins, from the Congressional Research Service, 
argue that extremists are online and using social media to help tailor recruiting messages 
                                                 
33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, 
September 2012 (New York: United Nations), 3-5. 
34 Is Al Qaeda’s Internet Strategy Working?: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security, 
112th Cong. (6 Dec 11), (statement of Brian M. Jenkins, The RAND Corporation). 
35 Ibid. 
36 “Internet Seen as Positive Influence,” 10. 
37 “Political Polarization and Media Habits,” Pew Research Center’s Internet, Science & Technology, 
21 Oct 14, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/ 
38 “Internet Seen as Positive Influence,” 10. 
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toward specific audiences. To help focus propaganda, violent extremist groups collect 
social media information on popular topics or individual users.39 This information allows 
violent extremists groups to align propaganda with popular topics or narrowcast 
propaganda toward personal preferences. Popular propaganda helps maintain a large 
online presence. Narrowcasted propaganda is used to produce echo chamber effects that 
resonate within potential recruits. 
Gabriel Weimann also supports the concept of narrowcasting. He says that 90 
percent of all online extremist activities take place within social media networks.40 In 
these vast social media networks, violent extremist groups collect social media users’ 
information that show interest in extremist websites, watch propaganda videos, or 
participate in extremist discussions. By collecting information from social media users, 
violent extremist groups can narrowcast propaganda to align with audience preferences or 
other popular topics.41 
By incorporating social media into communication organizations, Weimann 
believes that violent extremist groups have adapted hybrid communication structures. 
The top of the pyramid consists of central leadership that crafts major media and message 
themes. They also initiate the communication chain. Below the top are the well-
recognized supporters and new media managers. At the base of the pyramid are the 
virtual supporters that run chat rooms and independent sites.42 Blogs, social media, or 
mobile devices allow violent extremist groups to quickly communicate and widely 
distribute recruiting propaganda globally.43 Once propaganda is centrally created, which 
aligns with the overall agendas and goals, it is flatly distributed through online virtual 
supporters' networks. 
                                                 
39 Catherine A. Theohary and John Rollins, “Terrorist Use of the Internet: Information Operations in 
Cyberspace,” CRS Report to Congress, 8 Mar 11. 
40 Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace; Next Generation, 43. 
41 Ibid., 29. 
42 Ibid., 41. 
43 Ibid., 39. 
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Violent extremists can share seemingly benign posts or links to harmless 
sounding videos throughout social media networks. Author Yael Stein explains how 
recruiting propaganda is often hidden behind benign titles. Violent extremist groups 
create propaganda with titles such as “tactical shooting” or “how to field strip an AK-
47.”44 By titling propaganda with innocent names, violent extremist groups can 
potentially attract attention from social media users that may be interested in weapons. 
Marc Sageman briefed the United States Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and said that communication and coordination through social media are essential 
elements for recruiting. He said social media has replaced face-to-face recruiting with 
“virtual marketplaces.”45 
Within these marketplaces, potential recruits are weeded out of broad audiences 
when they show interest in the propaganda. These individuals are advanced through the 
recruiting process of sharing increasingly violent videos, forwarding links to violent 
videos, or discussing emotionally charged topics. Additionally, social media users are 
virtually introduced to more hard-core sympathizers.46 This virtual recruiting process 
utilizes the noise within an online echo chamber by bombarding potential recruits with 
violent propaganda and ideas to elicit emotional responses. The process of continued 
exposure to propaganda is an attempt to normalize violence and, in the future, potentially 
invoke a violent response from new members.47 After potential recruits are identified, 
they are transitioned to more secure and private forums.48 
                                                 




45 Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, 110th Cong. (8 May 
2008) (report presented to Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, and Susan Collins, Ranking Minority Member): 
13, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/IslamistReport.pdf?attempt=2. 
46 Weimann, “New Terrorism and New Media,” 6. 
47 Bob Drogin, “‘It's Like the Vanity Fair’ of Al Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, 27 November 2010, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/26/nation/la-na-terror-magazine-20101126. 




The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
details several types of propaganda that is produced and spread by al Qaeda and ISIS 
throughout social media. Examples include pictures, production-quality videos, glossy 
magazines, and video games, which will be discussed further in the following chapters.49 
4. Online Gaming 
The video game industry involves over a billion new media users annually.50 
Online games “set the mood, establish the setting, and introduces the narrative,” as Lev 
Manovich says, and thereby attracts enormous numbers of networked gamers.51 Matt 
Byrne of the Morning Sentinel says that these networked gamers represent huge 
communities where players can chat and interact freely and relatively anonymously.52 
Bridgette Nacos notes how several violent extremist groups have created online 
video games to access these larger numbers of gamers. Since its initial video game—
Ummah Defense—was an online hit, al Qaeda produced and released Ummah Defense II. 
Al Qaeda continues to advertise their online games, and both games remain available for 
free download on the Internet.53 
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
explains how ISIS tailored its video game after the popular game called Grand Theft 
Auto. By setting players in combat situations as ISIS members, the game exposes players 
to violent situations and potentially normalizes the concept of fighting with the group. 
The game’s high-end graphics and thrilling, violent scenarios acclimates players to the 
                                                 
49 “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: Branding, Leadership Culture, and Lethal Attraction,” 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, November 2014 31-3. 
50 Bohyun Kim, “The Popularity of Gamification in the Mobile and Social Era,” Library Technology 
Reports 51, no. 2 (February 2015): 5-10, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1658221210?accountid=12702. 
51 Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, 2001), 83. 
52 Matt Byrne, “Players of Online Video Games such as “World of Warcraft”... Derived Headline],” 
Morning Sentinel, 13 December2013, 
http://www.pressherald.com/2013/12/13/spy_games__players_scoff_at_news_that_the_nsa_looks_for_real
-life_evil-doers_in_the_online_gaming_worlds__saying_not_much_is_secret_there_/. 
53 Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Central Role of Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 113. 
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concept of fighting and entices gamers to seek additional information about the group.54 
These online games can serve as a gateway to transition gamers from a virtual 
environment into actual membership. 
5. Counterarguments 
A number of authors believe violent extremist groups must still rely on face-to-
face interaction to effectively recruit new members. In a hearing before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 
William F. McCants, Andrew A. Weisburd, and Brian M. Jenkins testified that most 
people who view online propaganda are immune from its effects.55 They went on to say 
that “only .00001% of the people who viewed [Al Qaeda propaganda] would go out to 
fight for Al Qaeda and even fewer would carry out suicide operations.”56 As a result, 
recruitment rates have not increased at a rapid pace.57 Beyond the virtual networking and 
coordination, there is a belief that interested social media users require offline elements 
and influences to be recruited.58 
Author David C. Benson argues that governments and violent extremist groups 
benefit equally from social media. He says that “the Internet leaves the states in the same 
position vis-à-vis extremist campaigns as it was prior to the Internet.”59 Since there is an 
absence of empirical data supporting the connection between social media and effective 
extremist recruitment, he argues that new media is similar to old media and all users 
profit from it equally. 
                                                 
54 “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: Branding, Leadership Culture, and Lethal Attraction,” 
32. 
55 Jihadist Use of Social Media—How to Prevent Terrorism and Preserve Innovation: Hearing Before 
the Committee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. (6 Dec 11), (statements of William F. McCants, 
Andrew A. Weisburd, and Brian M. Jenkins). 
56 Ibid., 6. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “Radicalisation: Role of Internet,” 3. 
59 David C. Benson, “Why the Internet Is Not Increasing Terrorism,” Security Studies, vol. 23, issue 2 
(2014): 293, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2014.905353. 
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Loraine Ali of the Los Angeles Times says that violent extremist groups do not 
rely on social media as a main recruiting method. She argues that social media 
supplements the “old shoe leather method of recruiting, which still happens and is very 
effective.”60 Since social media is potentially a supplemental tool, Ali believes that social 
media is one of many tools that violent extremists exploit to distribute propaganda and 
potentially recruit new members. 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter I includes the research question, the 
topic significance and relevance, the literature review, and potential explanations and 
hypothesis. Chapter II details how violent extremist groups utilize websites, blogs, social 
media, mobile devices, and online gaming when developing and distributing recruiting 
propaganda. Chapter III identifies how al Qaeda and ISIS have incorporated new media 
technologies into their communication structures. Additionally, this chapter compares 
and contrasts how each group uses social media to broadcast or narrowcast their 
recruiting messages and propaganda. Chapter IV reviews the proposed hypothesis and 
compares it to findings from Chapters II and III. This chapter also discusses 
counterterrorism efforts that can potentially corral violent extremist groups’ uses of new 
media and social media. Finally, Chapter IV offers potential areas for future study that 
can further enhance the limited empirical data surrounding violent extremist groups 
employing social media to recruit new members. 
Violent extremist groups have incorporated new media technologies and social 
media into recruiting strategies and propaganda. This thesis attempts to relay how violent 
extremist groups rely on social media to widely distribute propaganda and recruit new 
members. Within this thesis, several examples illustrate how violent extremist groups 
organize their communication structures to accommodate various new media 
technologies and social media in particular. By incorporating social media into 
communication structures and strategies, violent extremist groups project large online 
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presences and propagate messages directed toward specific audiences to attract new 
members. Several propaganda examples also illustrate how violent extremist groups rely 
heavily on social media to recruit new members. 
  
 15 
II. NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES 
New media has become the recruiting tool for violent extremist groups because, 
as Bridgette Nacos says, it “circumvent[s] the gatekeepers of traditional media and 
communicate[s] directly” with new media users.61 In addition to skirting media controls, 
new media grants users the ability to create and edit media quickly and distribute it 
globally.62 
Chapter II details five new media technologies that have grown in overall 
popularity: websites, blogs, social media, mobile devices, and online gaming. This 
chapter illustrates specific examples of how online users employ social media 
technologies to remain connected and interact through social media. 
A. WEBSITES 
Internet access continues to grow around the world, and the majority of Internet 
users access it on a daily basis.63 As a result, new media technologies have become 
intertwined with regular, daily social activity and have become a recognized piece of 
cultural influence. 
Unlike social media, websites are generally less interactive; they wait passively 
for Internet users to browse websites and require minimal user interaction.64 
Additionally, websites offer an endless supply of information in varying mediums that is 
filtered back to the user based on user-input.65 To provide easily accessible information 
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to online users, several violent extremist groups maintain an overt online presence and 
wait for curious or interested Internet users to visit their websites. 
Over the span of approximately 20 years, the number of violent extremist group 
websites has grown from a handful in the mid-1990s to nearly 10,000 by 2013.66 In a 
hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Bruce Hoffman 
relayed a post to al Qaeda's al Neda (the Call) website that directed group members to 
harness the power of the Internet: “The more Web sites, the better. We must make the 
Internet our tool.”67 In addition to al Neda, al Qaeda maintains several other websites 
such as al Ansar (the Helpers) and al Shumukh.68 Al Qaeda, however, is not the only 
violent extremist group that maintains an online presence. 
Despite condemning new media technologies, the Taliban maintains a webpage 
called al Emarah (the Emirate).69 The group produces videos that venerate their fighters 
and posts them to their webpage. Additionally, the website contains articles that are 
translated into Pashtu, Dari, Urdu, Arabic, and English.70 These videos have a two-fold 
intent. First, by highlighting and publicizing their fighters, the Taliban improves group 
morale because fighters receive notoriety. Second, the videos are a recruiting tool. By 
posting these videos online, the Taliban portrays their fighters as celebrities and purports 
that any new members will similarly receive world-wide distinction. Multi-language 
articles broaden the target audience and thereby increase the likelihood of attracting new 
members. The allure of long-lasting and enduring fame is a common tactic employed 
throughout violent extremist groups’ propaganda. 
A number of violent extremist groups maintain martyr sections on their webpages 
that glorify and publicize the actions and deaths of group members. Some webpages 
allow users to see pictures of martyrs; read their biographies and associated articles; and 
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watch videos of the individuals before, during, and after their deaths.71 The al Nusra 
Front72 posts articles, photos, and videos to their website immortalizing their shaheeds 
(martyrs for Islam).73 Similarly, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
maintains a martyr section on its webpage. Prior to their deaths, several videos portray 
members reading verses from the Quran, being surrounded by other members of the 
group, or holding various weapons.74 These martyr videos relay several messages to 
online viewers. 
By posting videos of people reading from the Quran before they die, violent 
extremists attempt to publically justify acts of terror, death, and destruction. Although 
those in the martyr videos die violent deaths, observers see that they will be forever 
immortalized on the Internet. By surrounding the would-be martyr with other violent 
extremists, the videos portray a sense of belonging and group membership, which can be 
a strong appeal to potential recruits. For those that find excitement in handling weapons 
or the ability to release aggression through fighting, videos display people with several 
types of guns and discuss the impending violence and destruction that awaits their 
enemies. 
Hamas uses a similar approach of exposing viewers to concepts of martyrdom; 
however, they target children. Hamas hosts al Aqsa—a children’s television series—and 
posts the episodes to their webpage. The show portrays characters that resemble Mickey 
Mouse, a bumblebee, and a rabbit that act out scenes of violence. Throughout several 
episodes, characters achieve martyrdom at the hands of their enemies. Seib and Janbek 
relay a stark reminder from one of the show’s characters: a bear tells children that they 
“must sacrifice everything that is dear to us until we regain our country” by avenging the 
martyred characters from previous seasons.75 By exposing children to themes of 
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destruction, revenge, and death, young viewers are acclimated to violent concepts and 
potentially normalize the concept of martyrdom. This process of acclimation and 
normalization can later be reinforced with other hardcore martyr videos. 
Despite their multi-faceted approaches to attract new members, websites are a 
passive approach to online recruiting. Therefore, when recruiting through websites, 
violent extremists must wait passively for Internet users to visit their pages or view 
propaganda hosted on their sites. 
B. BLOGS 
With continued technological advances and increased bandwidth, the Internet of 
the 1990s evolved from textual, low-level interaction to high levels of user-generated 
content, increased audio and video posts, uploads and downloads, and social 
networking.76 This highly interactive Web 2.0 is a user-defined and user-dependent 
online environment. The interactive aspects of new media and social media also allow 
violent extremist groups the ability to actively recruit rather than passively wait. 
Blogs developed out of the newly interactive Web 2.0, and they continue to 
project a substantial online presence. The Pew Research Center reports that roughly 33 
percent of all Internet users rely on blogs for focused information or late-breaking 
news.77 Users can choose from hundreds of thousands of blogs based on a broad range of 
topics. 
Similar to websites, blogs include texts, pictures, videos, or other forms of media 
pertaining to a specific topic. Unlike websites, however, blogs allow users the ability to 
leave comments or actively engage in online discussions.78 Because blogs or message 
boards are more interactive than websites, they allow online users to openly discuss 
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issues, comment on topics, or share ideas and thoughts. This free-flow of information 
also allows violent extremists to observe unsuspecting bloggers engage in opinionated 
discussions, gather their personal preferences or perspectives on topics, engage in 
discussions, or distribute links to extremist propaganda or websites. Once interested 
bloggers are identified, violent extremists can refer them to other more hardline websites 
or blogs. 
Violent extremist groups have expanded recruiting efforts into blogs because they 
help recruiting efforts in two main ways. First, by their very nature, blogs inadvertently 
assist violent extremists by helping them narrow or filter audiences. By searching through 
various blog topics, violent extremists can identify and further refine audiences based on 
specific blog topics. Once the specific blog and audience is identified, discussions and 
propaganda can be narrowcasted toward specific bloggers and their preferences. As an 
example, a simple search of The New York Times allows an online user the ability to 
select blogs based on politics, family-related issues, age-related issues, or several other 
topics. By selecting the family-related link, a user can join a blog that only pertains to 
motherhood, thereby producing an audience that is likely a female majority.79 Refining 
searches based on blog topic can further refine the target audience. After joining a 
specific blog and observing and interacting with bloggers, violent extremists can then 
interject comments, propaganda, or links that play off of bloggers’ personal preferences. 
The second benefit blogs afford violent extremists is popularity projection. Blogs 
unintentionally assist violent extremist groups by allowing them to identify popular 
topics based on trending data80—the popularity or amount of online activity. Having 
identified popular blogs or trending blog topics, violent extremists can interact with users, 
engage in discussions, and share links to propaganda or other violent extremist and 
thereby benefit from the popularity of a trending blog. 
Al Qaeda and ISIS provide two examples of using the popularity of blogs as a 
method of generating additional attention. In 2007, al Qaeda published over 48 
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propaganda videos and posted them online.81 Shortly after each video was posted, several 
al Qaeda supporters began discussing the videos on various blogs and shared links to sites 
that hosted the propaganda videos.82 Similarly, after posting English and Arabic versions 
of shows from its official radio station online, ISIS supporters began to create an online 
buzz by discussing topics related to the propaganda.83 
In both instances, al Qaeda and ISIS posted propaganda to websites and then 
began to generate discussions and interest on popular blogs. Once interest levels were 
increased and discussions began to expand online, the heightened levels of online activity 
continued to further generate interest and attention for each group and its videos. By 
using popular blogs, violent extremist groups projected themselves as being similarly 
popular, increased the group’s online attention, and potentially generated more recruiting 
opportunities. 
An article from the Technical Mujahidin, an online magazine that supports violent 
extremism, illustrated the increased interest in using blogs to recruit new members. The 
article’s author directs readers to completely exploit message boards and reminds readers 
to focus propaganda toward specific audiences—to narrowcast recruiting messages.84 
Although blogs vary by content, they allow violent extremist groups to focus on 
specific audiences based on specific blog topics and tailor recruiting propaganda toward 
audience preferences. Once a specific audience or popular blog is identified, violent 
extremists can virtually interact with bloggers and share propaganda or links to other sites 
based on user comments or preferences. 
Compared to websites, blogs allow violent extremists to actively interact with 
potential recruits. Additionally, blogs allow violent extremist groups the ability to narrow 
audiences by blog topic and thereby focus recruiting propaganda toward the target 
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audience. Alternatively, websites and blogs lack the networking aspects of social media 
and the regular, constant communication of mobile devices. 
C. SOCIAL MEDIA 
The number of social media sites that exist online, the amount of users that use 
them, and the amount of time spent on social media is massive. Approximately 70 
percent of Internet users maintain a social media account; they use it as a news source, 
for staying connected with friends and family, or sharing information with other users 
within their network.85 In the United States alone, social media use increased 37 percent 
from 2011 to 2012: in one year, social media use increased over seven billion hours in the 
United States.86 
Social media has quickly grown in popularity because it is user-friendly, 
accessible, and usually free.87 Additionally, social media affords Internet users the ability 
to find and virtually interact with family or friends. Social media also allows users to find 
other friends with common interests, preferences, or demographics, or they can share 
information about themselves. Once virtually networked with family or friends, users 
maintain connections and communications with others and further expand their network 
and audience by forwarding information and media to other users or networks.88 
Therefore, social media users can disperse information and media widely, quickly, and 
effortlessly throughout their personal and extended networks. Users are similarly exposed 
to information from other social media users and their extended social networks. 
These online social media networks have evolved into virtual communities based 
on varying demographics and social media platforms. Users view and interact with others 
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or voluntarily publicize personal information, photos, and videos via texts, voice, 
computers, or mobile devices.89 
In a recent Pew Research Center study, the most popular social media site online 
is Facebook.90 As of September of 2012, Facebook had an estimated 1 billion users 
around the world.91 Furthermore, approximately 50 percent of all Americans had a 
Facebook account—more than 150 million users.92 To maintain relevance and popularity 
among social media site users, Facebook released an update in May 2015 called ‘Instant 
Articles’ that allows news agencies the ability to publish articles directly to users’ 
personal pages. Additionally, in June of 2015, Facebook introduced the ‘Trending’ 
sidebar as a way for users to filter social media content by online volume or popularity.93 
Similar to blogs, Facebook introduced these new features to help users identify late-
breaking news or popular issues. 
Gabriel Weimann says that “90 percent of terrorist activity on the Internet takes 
place using social networking tools,” but some recruiting tactics are more overt than 
others.94 As an example, a simple search for al Qaeda on Facebook produced more than 
40 results.95 Additionally, in 2012, the Taliban established a Facebook page that quickly 
gathered over 280 “likes” from other social media users. The page was soliciting 
contributions for the Taliban’s quarterly magazine called Ahyah-e-Khlifat (Sign of the 
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Caliphate) before it was shut down.96 In 2014, Facebook users could buy various ISIS 
souvenirs such as toys or clothes. Figure 1 is an example of clothing that was available to 
Facebook users before administrators removed the site.97 
Figure 1.  ISIS T-shirt once sold on Facebook 
 
For some time, Facebook users could purchase black ISIS T-shirts until accounts that 
were selling them were shut down. Shirts contained the ISIS logo, an AK-47, and Arabic 
writing that was also translated into English. Source: “Isis Souvenir Gift Shops Shut 
Down by Facebook,” Telegraph.Co.Uk, 25 June 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10925871/Isis-souvenir-gift-shops-shut-down-by-
Facebook.html. 
When using Facebook, violent extremist groups remind members to remain 
amicable and hide aggression by creating innocent, misleading, and less aggressive 
Facebook pages.98 This alternative and unobtrusive Facebook activity allows violent 
extremists to interact covertly within social media networks. Once innocuous Facebook 
pages are established, violent extremists can invite others to join their network, or they 
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join other networks where more benign information can be shared. As an example, an 
ISIS member created a Facebook account that indicated he worked for a humanitarian 
group. He posted pictures of distributing food to refugee camps, shared personal 
experiences, and relayed the joys of belonging to the group.99 
Whether overt or surreptitious, a large Facebook presence provides violent 
extremists with access to a diverse and vast global audience. For some social media users, 
the “fiery Facebook pages [and] hate-filled chat rooms,” that Bob Drogin of the Los 
Angeles Times describes, are more appealing than the subtle allusions to violence.100 For 
others, violent extremists can spread propaganda throughout social media networks by 
hiding their true intentions and identity. Regardless of the tactic employed, online videos 
are a key component to propaganda attracting new media users and recruiting new 
members. 
New media users produce, watch, or discuss considerable amounts of videos or 
online television shows. Within social media, users often share videos or participate in 
discussions, post comments, or share links to video clips. To share videos or links to 
videos, video files must be uploaded to sites that allow networked users the ability to file-
share. YouTube, an Internet site that specializes in video sharing, is one of the most 
popular sites social media users frequently use to share videos. 
On a monthly basis, more than one billion social media users watch 
approximately six billion hours of online videos.101 Once videos are posted to YouTube, 
links to videos can be shared via blogs, social media, or other new media technologies. 
Another key YouTube feature is the ability to leave comments on videos. This ability to 
post comments is important for determining popularity and trending data, but it can also 
be used by violent extremists. The ability to post comments to videos can be exploited by 
violent extremists and is discussed further in Chapter III. 
                                                 
99 Deborah Richards, “The Twitter Jihad: ISIS Insurgents in Iraq, Syria Using Social Media to Recruit 
Fighters, Promote Violence,” ABC News, 20 June 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-20/isis-using-
social-media-to-recruit-fighters-promote-violence/5540474. 
100 Drogin, “‘Vanity Fair’ of Al Qaeda.” 
101 Ibid. 
 25 
Similar to blogs and Facebook, violent extremists have expanded recruiting 
efforts into YouTube. In 2004, a video was produced that portrayed terrorism as being 
“cool.” The four and a half minute rap video entitled Dirty Kuffar begins with an 
interview of a U.S. Marine after he killed a violent extremist. Afterwards, a masked man 
raps and dances around with a Quran in one hand and a gun in the other.102 He discusses 
the atrocities committed by the U.S. and Russia and praises the actions of September 11, 
2001. The video also encourages viewers to throw President Bush and Prime Minister 
Blair into fire. Figures 2 and 3 are taken from the Dirty Kuffar video, which is still 
available on YouTube.103 
Figure 2.  Masked Man with Quran and gun from Dirty Kuffar video 
 
Screen capture taken from the Dirty Kuffar video. Source: Sheikh Terra feat Soul Salah 
Crew Dirty Kuffar, YouTube, last accessed 7 October 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=SWP_95eSLBI. 
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Figure 3.  World Trade Center bombing praised in Dirty Kuffar video 
 
Screen capture taken from the Dirty Kuffar video. Source: Sheikh Terra feat Soul Salah 
Crew Dirty Kuffar, YouTube, last accessed 7 October 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SWP_95eSLBI. 
In 2010, approximately 750 Anwar al-Awlaki videos were posted on YouTube.104 
These videos contained violent themes and inflammatory rhetoric. Online viewers 
watched these 750 videos 3.5 million times before accounts that hosted the videos were 
disabled. Before the videos were removed from YouTube, Major Nidal Hasan, a U.S. 
Army officer, reportedly watched several videos and corresponded with Al-Awlaki prior 
to killing 13 people and injuring several others in the 2009 Fort Hood shooting.105 
Because YouTube is easy to use, it allows violent extremist groups the ability to 
distribute propaganda widely. Once videos are uploaded to a file-sharing site like 
YouTube, violent extremists can publicize the propaganda by distributing links to the 
video throughout blogs, social media, or other new media technologies. Additionally, 
YouTube provides violent extremists the ability to collect comments from viewers and 
thusly use them to further refine the distribution and application of propaganda or modify 
already existing propaganda based on user feedback. 
Similar to blogs, social media networks allow violent extremist groups to directly 
interact with large numbers of distributed social media users. Because they are extremely 
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popular and easy to use, social media sites such as Facebook and YouTube provide 
violent extremist groups with expansive networks in which to distribute propaganda. By 
projecting a large online presence and utilizing multiple tactics throughout social media, 
violent extremists can focus propaganda toward attracting new members. 
D. MOBILE PHONE DEVICES 
Cell phones and smart phones have become ubiquitous in everyday life. As a 
result, social media has adapted to incorporate mobile phone technology. Mobile devices 
ensure social media networks remain intact through regular and constant 
communication.106 To incorporate mobile device technologies into new media 
technologies, social media sites have adapted succinct message formats and short video 
clips.107 By limiting the number of words in text or video sizes, messages and media can 
be drafted, disseminated, or consumed quickly throughout social media networks by 
anyone with a smartphone. For longer messages and videos, links are forwarded via text 
or email to the location of the large-format files. 
Smartphones are an important new media technology that incorporates social 
media and regular, constant contact among networked users. Smartphones allow social 
media users the ability to receive instantaneous updates on news and information from 
various online sources and throughout social media networks. The speed of information 
updates and dissemination attracts social media users to smartphone technology. To 
satisfy the desire for “as-it-happens coverage and commentary on live events”—as 
Michael Barthel and his co-authors describe it—Twitter has established itself as a popular 
new media technology for mobile devices.108 
Twitter is designed as a phone-based social media application, and it has a global 
online presence.109 For late-breaking news, new media users are more likely to seek 
information on Twitter than other social media sites. Later, users can share related 
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information or further discuss topics on other social media networks.110 In the 2012 
presidential campaign season, approximately 140 million tweets were posted through 
Twitter accounts on a daily basis.111 By 2013, over half a billion users tweeted 
approximately 9,100 messages every second.112 Therefore, Twitter has shown it has the 
capability to produce vast amounts of online volume through mobile devices and social 
media networks. 
Since cell phones have become popular around the world, some violent extremist 
groups have incorporated this new media technology into recruiting efforts. As an 
example, some violent extremist groups allow members to download ringtones that can 
be installed on members’ phones.113 These identifiable and distinguishing downloads are 
likely intended to establish a sense of identity and group membership and, in doing so, 
recruit new media users. 
Violent extremist groups have also incorporated Twitter’s expansive network and 
ability to produce an enormous amount of online activity on a global scale into their 
recruiting strategies. To help maintain high levels of online propaganda and project a 
large presence, Loraine Ali of the Los Angeles Times says that ISIS amasses large 
“Twitterbot armies.”114 Groups can amass tens of thousands of Twitter accounts to create 
‘Twitter bombs’ that flood the virtual landscape with tweets pertaining to propaganda or 
topics relating to violent extremist groups.115 By presenting large numbers of associated 
tweets, Twitter armies create trending topics, portray violent extremist groups as being 
popular, and thereby attract more attention and potential recruits. The massive amounts of 
tweets also allow audiences to easily find propaganda or inadvertently view recruiting 
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propaganda, which can also help connect potential recruits with other members already in 
the group. 
Twitter or other smart phone applications limit message sizes, so violent 
extremists modify propaganda to accommodate mobile devices. Brian Bennett of the 
Orlando Sentinel relayed a number of short tweet examples from the Taliban: 
“Mujahideen fighter kill 4 American cowards, hurts several more in encounter: Ghazni. 
US terrorists martyr 12-year-old boy, detains many others: Paktika. American criminals 
martyr 5 innocent civilians in raid: Kandahar.”116 
These quick and concise tweets provide the Taliban or other violent extremist 
groups that use similar new media technologies with two main benefits. First, the Taliban 
floods social media with provocative propaganda—either slanted toward itself or against 
opponents. By producing large amounts of propaganda and distributing it widely 
throughout social media networks, the Taliban begins to establish support or sympathy 
for victims and aggression against those that purportedly martyred them. Second, the 
quick and widespread propaganda forces an opposition to fight both a physical and 
virtual battle. By quickly distributing information throughout social media networks via 
mobile devices, the opposition must defend itself from the Taliban claims concerning 
ongoing operations. Therefore, the Taliban puts its opponent on the virtual defense by 
attempting to refute the Taliban propaganda. 
Beyond the ability to distribute propaganda quickly, L. Gordon Crovitz of The 
Wall Street Journal says that smart phones provide violent extremist groups with a 
distinct advantage over opponents. After identifying potential recruits, violent extremist 
groups instruct them to transition future communications to a smartphone because of its 
encryption capabilities. If correspondence, propaganda, or other terror-related 
communications are detected or smartphones are confiscated, Crovitz says that efforts are 
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useless because “the signal is indecipherable.”117 Therefore, in addition to providing 
violent extremist groups with a quick method of distributing propaganda broadly, 
smartphones encrypt communications between associated participants, so violent 
extremists can continue recruiting efforts via secure communications. 
For many, social media is a popular and easy way of remaining connected with a 
group of networked users and informed of ongoing news. For violent extremist groups, 
social media provides direct access to dispersed networks and vast audiences. Since 
mobile devices help users maintain social media connections, violent extremists have 
similarly adjusted recruiting propaganda to account for mobile device restrictions. 
Additionally, mobile devices provide violent extremist groups with an encryption 
capability so recruiting efforts can continue uninhibited via secure communications. 
E. ONLINE GAMING 
Similar to social media, the video game industry gathers huge amounts of users 
into large, distributed networks. On any given week, new media users spend 3 billion 
hours per week playing games online.118 In 2009, a single game—Activision Blizzard's 
World of Warcraft—amassed 11.5 million users worldwide.119 In 2013, the number of 
people playing online games was expected to reach 1.2 billion by the end of the year.120 
Online video games involve networked communities and a substantial number of 
players that can chat and interact freely and anonymously.121 Beyond email, texts, or 
normal social media interaction, online gaming offers numerous communication avenues 
and ways of organizing into groups and networks. 
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Lev Manovich says that online gaming is one of the largest growth industries 
where “cinematic interface is being transformed into a cultural interface.”122 Gaming has 
an enormous cinematic appeal to users because it allows players to interact and explore 
with other players and navigate through a narrative and new environment. Additionally, 
when playing online, gamers strategize cooperatively to overcome virtual obstacles and, 
through several emotional highs and lows, tend to bond with other online players.123 This 
bonding aspect of online gaming helps to reinforce relationships that can potentially 
flourish though other new media technologies. 
Several violent extremist groups have developed games to interact with these 
large online communities. In the anti-Israeli game entitled Under Ash, users can choose 
from a variety of weapons to destroy Israeli military installations. Its sequel, Under Ash 
2, remains available for free download to Internet users. Figures 4 and 5 are screen 
captures from the game download page. Figure 4 shows a player in armed conflict against 
a large military group. Figure 5 depicts a player engaging an Israeli tank, which is a 
reference to the David and Goliath story. The download page also informs players that 
the game is based on actual events.124 
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Figure 4.  Player from Under Ash assaulting military forces 
 
Screen capture taken from the Under Ash 2 video game. The image is available to view 
on the game download page. Source: Under Siege, Under Ash, last accessed 7 October 
2015, http://www.underash.net/en_download.htm. 
Figure 5.  Player from Under Ash fighting a tank with rocks 
 
Screen capture taken from the Under Ash 2 video game. Image is available to view on the 





Another game, The Resistance, sets players as the Islamic resistance in South 
Lebanon. Rebecca Armstrong from The Independent relays that the resistance defends 
homelands against the “invading Zionists.”125 In a final example, Hezbollah’s Special 
Force game allows players to virtually experience conditions similar to those of actual 
group members. Gamers fight in tough weather conditions, navigate mine fields, and 
battle against enemy troops. Additionally, when training for missions, players can hone 
their sniper skills by executing Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.126 
Just as violent extremist groups have expanded recruiting efforts into blogs, social 
media, and other new media technologies, they have incorporated online games into their 
recruiting strategies. By developing games with a cinematic appeal and narrative that 
requires players to cooperatively overcome tough obstacles,127 violent extremist groups 
attempt to tap into the vast numbers of people playing games online and potentially 
establish an online relationship with gamers that can potentially metastasize through 
social media or other new media technologies. 
The growth of Web 2.0 has allowed online users to transition from passive 
website browsing to active interaction with others. Similarly, violent extremist groups 
can actively interact with bloggers, social media users, or online gamers. This direct 
contact with potential recruits allows violent extremist groups to employ various overt or 
less obtrusive recruiting methods and transition potential recruits from open online 
networks to mobile devices that provide unbreakable encryption and communication 
security. As the Internet, Web 2.0, and other new media technologies continue to evolve, 
so do the recruiting efforts of violent extremist groups. 
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III. VIOLENT EXTREMIST GROUP COMMUNICATIONS 
Social media provides violent extremist groups with direct access to a global 
audience and increases the likelihood of crossing virtual paths with would-be recruits.128 
Once access is established, messages and media must resonate within audiences to attract 
the largest amount of attention and thereby recruit new members. This is why 
communication structures and strategies are key components to analyze within violent 
extremist groups.129 
Chapter III identifies the communication structures of two well-known violent 
extremist groups—al Qaeda and ISIS. The second part of the chapter covers each group’s 
communication strategies and messages for recruiting. Within this section, particular 
attention is given to the two groups’ similar communication structures, strategies, and 
delivery method, but they have divergent recruiting messages. 
A. COMMUNICATION STRUCTURES 
Two general communication structures exist within organizations: vertical or 
horizontal. Hierarchical organizations often use vertical communication structures for 
message control and consistency. In these structures, themes and major messages are 
established centrally and then later distributed throughout the rest of the ranks. Because 
messages are developed centrally, they are congruent with overall organizational 
strategies and therefore align with future operations.130  
Alternatively, horizontal or flat structures communicate throughout the 
organization quickly and simultaneously. These organizations often rely heavily on the 
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networking aspect of social media to increase the speed of communication, breadth of 
distribution, and often involve audiences in additional circulations.131 
Both communication structures have a downside. Vertical structures can be 
cumbersome or slow and cause unwanted delays. Alternatively, messages in horizontal 
structures can become incongruent with organizational strategies, confusing to audiences, 
and potentially disrupt achieving goals within established timelines. 
A large online presence is instrumental to a violent extremist group’s ability to 
gather attention and recruit new members.132 To attract attention and thereby recruit new 
members, violent extremist groups have adapted hybrid communication structures that 
combine the benefits of both vertical and horizontal structures. At their center, leadership 
controls the core structure and manages main operations and communication 
strategies.133 As messages and media flow from the core, the communication structure 
flattens so propaganda can be distributed quickly and globally. 
Weimann describes this hybrid structure as a communication pyramid. At the top, 
the central leadership develops objectives and strategies and initiates the communication 
chain. The middle portion consists of well-recognized supporters and new media 
managers that oversee official websites and publicize sanctioned messages. As the 
structure flattens, websites and messages become less controlled and less official. New 
media technologies such as blogs, social media, or mobile devices allow violent extremist 
groups’ virtual supporters—the base of the pyramid—to communicate quickly and 
distribute propaganda globally.134 
In this hybrid structure, propaganda is centrally created to align with overall 
agendas and goals, propagated through middle tiers and sanctioned sources, and 
distributed flatly through new media technologies, unofficial websites, and social media 
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networks. Since virtual supporters are socially networked and globally dispersed,135 they 
provide violent extremist groups with a large online presence, despite producing 
messages that are potentially inconsistent with central objectives and strategies. 
1. Al Qaeda Communication Structure 
Al Qaeda has adopted the hybrid communication structure. At its core, the 
organization is hierarchically structured and contains several branches and committees. 
The Media Committee formulates propaganda to align with the group’s strategy and is 
closely aligned with the Al Sahab (the Cloud) Institute for Media Production136—the 
group’s main media producer. Al Sahab uses high-end equipment to produce media and 
follows tight distribution protocols for uploading videos to websites and chat rooms.137 
Once propaganda is centrally created and posted online, it progresses through the lower 
and flatter levels of the organization. 
In the middle of al Qaeda’s communication structure, groups and individuals are 
closely aligned with the core’s central objectives. The Al Fajr (The Dawn), an element 
aligned with Al Sahab, coordinates and distributes media through webmasters around the 
world.138 These webmasters and other middle members help to distribute guidance and 
propaganda posted to the group’s main websites: Al Ansar and Al Shumukh.139 This 
middle group also helps coordinate logistical movements, travel for new members, or 
local operations.140 
At the periphery of the hybrid structure are those that participate in the “media 
jihad,” as Manuel Torres Soriano, senior lecturer at the Pablo de Olavide University of 
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Seville, terms it.141 These online supporters operate autonomously, further distribute 
links to sites and propaganda, and maintain loosely aligned sites that produce lower 
quality propaganda. This group plays an important role in maintaining al Qaeda’s online 
presence by translating media into local languages, further disseminating it, and 
maintaining a constant distribution flow of propaganda and media.142 
By adopting this hybrid communication structure, Rohan Gunaratna, Director of 
International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang 
Technological University, says that al Qaeda’s core guides and manipulates the main 
“global jihad movement,” and remains in the background.143 The lower levels execute 
the communication strategy by maintaining a large online presence and distributing 
propaganda throughout social media networks. 
2. ISIS Communication Structure 
Similar to al Qaeda, ISIS has developed a three-tier hybrid communication 
structure: a central core, provincial information offices, and broad members and 
supporters. At its core, ISIS created four central media outlets to produce large 
propaganda pieces that align with core objectives and manage dissemination operations—
al Hayat, al-Furqan, al-Itisam, and Ajnad.144 For al Hayat, recruiting is a primary 
objective. As a potential recruiting tool, Richard Barrett, Senior Vice President of The 
Soufan Group, says that al Hayat regularly publishes a video series called 
“Mujatweets.”145 These videos are well-prepared and well-choreographed to portray ISIS 
positively to online audiences. They provide first-hand accounts and experiences from 
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fighters and relay the benefits of belonging to the group. Barrett says that ISIS’ central 
media outlets are “well-disciplined and well-organized,” focusing largely on international 
audiences, overall strategies, and aligning major messages with overall operations.146 
The mid-level tier of provincial offices is distributed regionally throughout Iraq 
and Syria. This group also contributes to ISIS’ vast online presence by supplementing the 
central communication apparatus with massive quantities of smaller communications.147 
Additionally, prior to publicizing major propaganda pieces, provincial offices conduct 
online popularity surveys to determine if new propaganda will be received positively by 
online viewers. As an example, before ISIS declared itself as a caliphate, the group 
conducted market research through social media to see if social media users would 
support the announcement.148 By prefacing releases with online surveys, the group 
attempts to gauge online reactions and anticipates future levels of public support. 
Additionally, by polling social media, publications and announcements can be modified 
to incorporate audience preferences, or they can be delayed until adequate levels of 
online support are generated. 
At the lower level of the hybrid structure are virtual supporters. This group 
publicizes issues and discussions and further distributes propaganda via new media 
technologies and social media networks.149 To help maintain a large online presence and 
constant flow of propaganda, this group uses several social media applications that 
automatically forward messages and links. As an example, some virtual supporters use 
the application called Dawn of Good Tidings. It remains below social media spam 
thresholds but continues to forward propaganda throughout social media networks.150 
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Unlike al Qaeda, ISIS attempts to maintain control of the lower levels of its 
hybrid communication structure. To maintain order and communication discipline within 
social media networks, ISIS enacted two internal control mechanisms. The first is a fine 
system: users are fined for improper communication procedures, not following protocol, 
or sending messages that contradict other propaganda. After a number of fines, users 
have their social media account deactivated or are ostracized completely from the 
group.151 
In December 2014, ISIS issued the second control measure that required members 
to disable GPS on all mobile devices. If members disobeyed the order or missed the one-
month suspense, their phones were confiscation or destroyed.152 Though the second 
control measure was not intended to affect propaganda themes, both examples illustrate 
that ISIS exploits the benefits of flat communications and new media technologies, but it 
attempts to maintain centralized control over its hybrid structure. For ISIS, members in 
the flat portion of their structure contribute positively to the group’s virtual identity and 
global persona; however, the group attempts to centrally control propaganda so messages 
do not conflict with central strategies or negatively impact recruiting. 
Al Qaeda and ISIS both utilize a hybrid communication structure. At their cores, 
propaganda and message themes are centrally developed and controlled. As propaganda 
flows from the center, both groups’ communication structure flattens. Propaganda is then 
distributed quickly and broadly throughout social media networks. Additionally, as new 
propaganda pieces are distributed, al Qaeda and ISIS both utilize the flat portions of their 
communication structures to generate online attention and interest, which was discussed 
in Chapter II. 
Unlike al Qaeda, ISIS attempts to maintain communication discipline and 
message consistency. To manage messages throughout its communication structure, ISIS 
forces members to adhere to control measures. Additionally, ISIS uses the middle tier of 
its communication structure to poll audience preferences and support levels. 
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B. COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES 
To reach diverse audiences, violent extremist groups create propaganda that can 
appeal generally to broad audiences. Alternatively, narrowcasted propaganda focuses a 
message toward specific groups or individuals. Gabriel Weimann defines narrowcasting 
as tailoring messages toward “specific segments of the public defined by values, 
preferences, demographic attributes, or subscription.”153 When adjusting propaganda, 
violent extremist groups must consider the preferences of the audiences they wish to 
influence. 
Violent extremist groups’ ability to broadcast and narrowcast recruiting 
propaganda depends upon social media users’ comments on videos, television shows, or 
other types of media.154 This comment option allows groups to identify trending social 
media topics and gather specific user information and preferences. After trending data 
and personal information is collected, the group can shape propaganda that aligns broadly 
with popular topics or focuses on individual preferences. 
In addition to collecting social media users’ comments, violent extremist groups 
frame propaganda to appeal to audiences.155 As an example, a terrorist is an evildoer that 
commits illegal acts of terrorism against innocent victims. Alternatively, a jihadi is a 
freedom fighter that struggles under the oppression of a secular enemy. These two 
phrases describe the same action, but a positive portrayal of violence attempts to 
legitimize actions and elicit strong emotions that can potentially blossom into increased 
interest and recruitment. 
1. Al Qaeda Communication Strategy 
Al Qaeda broadcasts its focused message of justified violence: terrorism is 
necessary for the jihad (the struggle) against unbelievers.156 By using this Islamic term, 
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al Qaeda concentrates propaganda toward the Muslim diaspora, and it attempts to create a 
correlation between violence and being a devout Muslim. For the audience, the message 
relays that terrorism is a necessary action that devout Muslims should commit against 
unbelievers. Weimann relayed al Qaeda’s justification for violence; if Muslims do not 
accomplish their duty, al Qaeda threatened that they will be held accountable to “Allah 
on the day of judgment.”157 Although this message focuses on Muslims, al Qaeda 
broadcasts it by demanding all Muslims to attack non-Muslims.158 
Al Qaeda uses several online magazines to broadcast its strategy to massive 
audiences. To attract readers and gather support for the group, Bob Drogin of the Los 
Angeles Times says that al Qaeda uses several “glitzy graphics” and “reader-friendly 
stories” in their online magazines.159 In Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad), an article’s 
author focuses on mobilizing Muslims to commit jihad.160 In another online magazine, 
Mu'askar al-Battar (Camp of the Sword), an article covered online recruiting and 
suggested that new members should remain in their local surroundings after being 
recruited.161 By instructing new members to remain in-place, al Qaeda can focus 
recruiting efforts in areas they wish to commit future acts of terrorism. These online 
magazines are not the only example of al Qaeda broadcasting while focusing on a 
specific group. 
Al Qaeda's online magazine Inspire illustrates how the group broadcasts and 
narrowcasts simultaneously. The magazine provides readers with new and easy ways to 
commit terrorism against non-Muslims, but it is published in English to attract Western 
audiences.162 Similarly, al Qaeda publishes al Battar (Sword of the Prophets), another 
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online magazine translated into multiple languages. As Drogin described, the magazine 
attracts readers with colorful images, and it provides readers with several ways of 
conducting hand-to-hand combat.163 
These online magazines focus on Muslim audiences, but they are distributed 
globally throughout social media networks and are openly available. Because they are 
translated into multiple languages, al Qaeda propaganda reaches diverse audiences and 
encourages them to commit terrorism against non-Muslims. Since al Qaeda has expanded 
into the massive and global social media networks, the group broadcasts its focused 
recruiting message. 
Yael Stein, of Genocide Prevention Now, quoted al Qaeda leadership directing 
members to “invade” Facebook and interact with more “mainstream Muslims.”164 Once 
members had gained access to social media networks, al Qaeda directed its members to 
collect information and comments from social media users pertaining to popular issues or 
topics with positive feedback.165 Having accesses to and collecting this social media 
information allows al Qaeda to align propaganda with popular social media topics, 
thereby benefiting from the overall online popularity. This popularity helps draw 
attention to the group and potentially attracts new members. Additionally, having access 
to social media users’ personal preferences allows al Qaeda to narrowcast messages and 
potentially recruit with propaganda tailored toward individual preferences. 
Figure 6 is an image from al Qaeda’s YouTube channel that was launched on 11 
September 2012. Members are allowed to leave comments on speeches, videos, or other 
propaganda that are posted to the channel. Additionally, followers are notified when new 
information is added to the channel, so they can remain up-to-date on al Qaeda issues.166 
This feedback option on the YouTube channel allows al Qaeda to collect comments from 
social media users and adjust future propaganda toward popular posts or individual 
preferences. 
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Figure 6.  Al Qaeda’s YouTube channel 
 
An image of al Qaeda’s YouTube channel. Source: Gabriel Weimann, Terrorism in 
Cyberspace; the Next Generation (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 
2015), 5. 
Al Qaeda also broadcasts throughout online games, but they remain focused on 
Muslims. In the group’s online video game series called Ummah Defense, online players 
save the planet and rescue chapters of the Quran from invading robots. The game 
reinforces the concepts of remaining faithful to Islam and defending the community of 
believers from opposition. Additionally, the video game portrays al Qaeda members as 
elite, “sexy” fighters that support a worthy cause. Although this propaganda is another 
example of Muslim-focused narrowcasting, it is intended to appeal to the broad online 
gaming community. 
Figure 7 is from the sequel to the original Ummah Defense video game. This 
game illustrates how al Qaeda attempts to utilize benign images and storylines to deliver 
messages of justified violence in the name of religion.167 
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Figure 7.  Al Qaeda video game entitled Ummah Defense II 
 
Ummah Defense II—the sequel to al Qaeda’s popular video game Ummah Defense. 
Source: Chris Suellentrop, “The Evildoers Do Super Mario Bros.; The War on Terror's 
least-frightening video games,” Slate, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ 
gaming/2005/08/the_evildoers_do_super_mario_bros.html. 
Guns attract some thrill seekers, so al Qaeda posts seemingly benign gun videos 
throughout social media to attract their attention. Stein relayed three videos that al Qaeda 
created and publicized widely throughout Facebook: “tactical shooting,” “getting to know 
your AK-47,” and “how to field strip an AK-47.”168 Social media users that attempted to 
watch the videos were redirected to al Qaeda webpages where more violent videos and 
other propaganda pieces were available. Once at the al Qaeda-hosted sites, social media 
users could peruse more terror-related videos or other propaganda pieces. Admittedly, all 
social media users do not explore every video and link posted throughout social media; 
however, these videos are examples of al Qaeda narrowcasting beyond Muslim 
audiences. They were intended for any social media user that enjoys the excitement of 
handling guns. 
Two specific propaganda pieces encapsulate al Qaeda’s communication strategy: 
Al Neda, an official al Qaeda website, and an online al Qaeda video. The website says 
that the group’s ongoing operations are to defend the ummah (Islamic nation or 
community).169 In this statement, al Qaeda broadcasts to Muslims that terrorism 
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operations are justified when defending the nation of Islam. Since this message discusses 
an overall defensive strategy for the nation of Islam, it broadly calls for anyone willing to 
help in the overall struggle. Additionally, al Qaeda infers that anyone engaging in 
terrorism is considered a devout Muslim. 
The second propaganda piece is an online video entitled “You Are Only 
Responsible for Yourself.”170 In the video, al Qaeda encourages Muslims to conduct 
violence without having to wait for orders from the main group.171 Since this video 
attempts to illicit violence against non-Muslims, al Qaeda predominantly narrowcasts 
toward Muslims but broadcasts to anyone willing to commit terrorism against non-
Muslims. 
Al Qaeda broadcasts its predominantly Muslim-focused recruiting message, but it 
has expanded its message to any group or individual willing to commit acts of terrorism 
against non-Muslims. By using passive websites and online magazines and expanding 
into interactive social media, al Qaeda maintains a large online presence and disseminates 
propaganda broadly. Additionally, the group exploits the online gaming environment as 
another way to expose vast audiences to the concept of using terrorism as a method of 
protecting beliefs. By broadcasting focused propaganda toward specific groups, al Qaeda 
attempts to recruit new members that are purportedly devout enough to commit terrorism 
in the name of jihad against non-Muslims. 
2. ISIS Communication Strategy 
Similar to al Qaeda, ISIS broadcasts and narrowcasts recruiting propaganda. 
Unlike al Qaeda, ISIS propaganda contains two types of messages: legitimize violence 
through intimidation or project success to recruit new members. The message of 
intimidation that ISIS broadcasts via social media justifies terrorism as a legitimate 
means of protection. Haroro Ingram, Research Fellow at the Australian National 
University, said that ISIS devotes a “significant portion of its [propaganda] activities to 
portraying its governance apparatus as multidimensional, sophisticated, bureaucratized 
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and well resourced.”172 Therefore, when ISIS declared Muslim statehood in 2014, it 
telegraphed to the world that it had established a legitimate government. This message 
portrays that ISIS maintains the legal authority to violently defend itself from any 
opposition. 
Bruce Hoffman supports the notion that violent extremists use propaganda to 
intimidate others.173 For ISIS, their intimidation propaganda involves extremely violent 
acts of terror, and it is broadcasted to audiences via several new media technologies.174 
Examples of their intimidation propaganda include mass executions, mass beheadings, 
burning people alive, or other tortuous scenes. This propaganda is uploaded then to 
YouTube for wide distribution. 
Figure 8 is taken from an ISIS video that was posted to YouTube, but YouTube 
has since removed the video. In the video, ISIS members execute several Yazidi 
prisoners.175 Because ISIS’ virtual supporters repeatedly posted the video to a number of 
additional sites and widely distributed links to these sites, as the video was removed or 
sites were blocked, new sites would emerge and links would be redistributed to the new 
video locations.176 Since ISIS declared it had established a Muslim government, it 
attempted to justify removing enemies of the state that, in this case, included Yazidis.177 
By publicly broadcasting this propaganda throughout social media networks, ISIS 
displayed its resolve and willingness to resort to extreme measures to defend its state, 
even against an enemy inside its border. Additionally, this propaganda is meant to 
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intimidate viewers and governments. It telegraphs that any opposition will face a violent 
and similar fate to that of the Yazidis.178 
Figure 8.  ISIS conducting an execution 
 
An image of ISIS members executing Yazidi prisoners. Source: Jordan Schachtel, 
“Reports: ISIS Militants Mass-Murder 300 Yazidi Hostages,” Breitbart, 2 May 2015, 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/05/02/reports-isis-militants-mass-
murder-300-yazidi-hostages/. 
The second messaging theme in ISIS’ communication strategy is broadcasting 
success. By projecting a large online presence, Lorraine Ali of the Los Angeles Times 
says ISIS portrays that the “crowd is in it, it is a cause worthy of joining, and you're 
going to win” if you join them. Brand recognition helps promote the group as being 
successful and popular.179 Like other well-known companies or organizations, ISIS 
publicizes its brand by selling hoodies, bandanas, and hats through online sales. Much of 
the group’s success-related propaganda is also devoid of a specific location or religious 
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content.180 Unlike al Qaeda’s propaganda that predominantly focuses on Muslims, ISIS 
videos broadly invite anyone to join in the group’s success and prosperity. 
ISIS publicizes success through other means as well. The group internally 
developed an Android application that automatically spams Twitter accounts with vast 
amounts of tweets.181 ISIS also employs applications such as Hootsuite, Tweetbot, 
BufferApp, or IFFT that spam social media users with propaganda.182 Since these 
applications are publicly available, ISIS has incorporated them into its broadcasting-
success strategy. By using these spamming applications, ISIS generates large amounts of 
social media propaganda and attention and thereby develops the group’s online presence. 
ISIS publishes propaganda in another broadcasting method that Ali calls “bait and 
switch.”183 In this technique, ISIS creates propaganda and posts it to popular social 
media sites such as Twitter. The group’s virtual supporters then create Twitter messages 
that contain hashtags and links that closely relate to high-trending, large-scale, or global 
events. When users visit the hashtags or links, they are redirected to ISIS propaganda. As 
an example, in 2014, Scotland voted on independence from England. ISIS exploited the 
online popularity by creating and publicizing Twitter hashtags called #Scotland and 
#ScotlandDecides. When Twitter users clicked on the hashtags, they were redirected to 
tweets that contained links to ISIS propaganda posted on YouTube.184 
Another bait and switch example includes focusing on soccer fans. During World 
Cup finals, ISIS posted an image of a decapitated Iraqi police officer on Twitter with the 
#WorldCup hashtag. When users clicked on the hashtag, they were redirected to the tweet 
containing the image of the decapitated officer. Under the image, Deborah Richards, 
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from the Australian Broadcast Corporation, says that ISIS posted the caption “this is our 
ball.”185 
Similar to al Qaeda, ISIS focuses propaganda toward specific groups. Richards 
relays posts from ISIS fighters on Facebook networks: “fighting in Syria is fun,” and the 
whole situation is “thrilling.”186 By relaying these first-hand accounts from members 
fighting in the field, ISIS attempts to assuage any reluctance or fears from Facebook 
readers and thereby portrays membership as being “fun” and “exciting.” Members of 
ISIS also relayed that they were contributing to a worthy cause and felt a sense of 
fulfillment.187 ISIS, therefore, portrays that membership provides individuals with an 
exciting way of gaining notoriety and establishing a sense of identity, which are both 
strong recruiting appeals when attempting to attract new members. 
Similar to al Qaeda, ISIS has expanded recruiting efforts into online gaming. The 
group developed a video game tailored after the already popular online game called 
Grand Theft Auto. Figure 9 is a screen capture from ISIS’ first-person video game. 
Online players are set as ISIS fighters that encounter various combat situations. The game 
provides users with high-end graphics and thrilling, violent scenarios. It also exposes 
users to violent situations against an indiscriminant opposition.188 
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Figure 9.  ISIS video game 
 
An image from ISIS’ first-person shooter video game. Source: “The Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant: Branding, Leadership Culture, and Lethal Attraction,” National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, November 2014, 32. 
ISIS propaganda focuses on specific groups such as those interested in the 
Scotland referendum or World Cup soccer. The group utilizes social media to identify 
popular events or topics and broadcasts its messages around these popular topics to 
publicize their messages of legitimacy, intimidation, and success. Although these topics 
can apply to specific audiences, ISIS produces propaganda that applies broadly to popular 
topics and audiences. 
Similar to al Qaeda, ISIS uses social media to broadcasts messages to vast and 
distributed audiences, potentially garnering online attention and thereby attracting social 
media users. In addition to expanding recruiting efforts into social media, both groups 
access the huge numbers of online gamers by each producing their own video game. 
Additionally, after collecting trending information, Al Qaeda and ISIS both positively 
frame their propaganda to align with topics that are popular throughout social media. 
Unlike al Qaeda, ISIS broadcasts the use of terrorism as the legal and legitimate 
use of force to govern and defend its territory and invites others to join in their 
success.189 Al Qaeda, on the other hand, broadcasts a recruiting appeal toward a global 
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Muslim population. Despite predominantly focusing on Muslims, al Qaeda attempts to 
justify terrorism and recruit anyone to commit terrorism against non-Muslims. Although 
al Qaeda and ISIS both narrowcast, ISIS uses narrowcasting by focusing on popular 
topics or groups to help maintain a large online presence and further broadcast its 
messages. 
C. CHAPTER ANALYSIS 
Al Qaeda and ISIS have both incorporated a hybrid communication structure. 
This structure allows both groups to centrally control communication strategies and 
propaganda themes. By expanding into expansive social media networks, al Qaeda and 
ISIS distribute propaganda flatly and quickly to global audiences. Although both groups 
utilize hybrid communication structures, ISIS attempts to control each section of its 
structure through a number of control mechanisms. 
Several of this chapter’s examples illustrate how both groups utilize several social 
media outlets to further distribute propaganda. By distributing and redistributing large 
quantities of propaganda throughout popular new media technologies, al Qaeda and ISIS 
expose large audiences to recruiting propaganda, maintain strong online presences, and 
thereby attract attention and potentially recruit new members. 
Both groups survey audiences to focus propaganda. Although al Qaeda collects 
information from social media users, most propaganda is tailored toward Muslims. ISIS, 
on the other hand, uses popular or trending topics to mask its propaganda or redirect 
social media users to other propaganda sites. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, ISIS uses 
social media to predict audience support prior to releasing major propaganda pieces. 
Since online games attract huge numbers of networked players, al Qaeda and ISIS 
have both developed video games to access these vast audiences. Al Qaeda’s games 
maintained a focus on Muslims by centering on the defense of Islam. ISIS, on the other 
hand, mirrored its game after another widely popular online game. This way, ISIS, 
exploited the popularity of another new media technology or topic and thereby benefited 
through association or assimilation. 
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A stark contrast exists between al Qaeda and ISIS messages. Al Qaeda attempts to 
recruit others to commit terrorism against non-Muslims anywhere in the world.190 
Alternatively, Richard Barrett says that ISIS is focused on a “violent revolution in 
Muslim majority countries [rather] than attacking their Western sponsors.”191 Therefore, 
as Barrett puts it, ISIS is concerned with gaining and maintaining control of its territory, 
and they would like nothing more than for the West to “leave it alone to establish the 
Utopia.”192 By projecting a large and successful online image, ISIS also invites others to 
join them in their success. 
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This final chapter analyzes the validity of the posed hypothesis in Chapter I—
violent extremist groups rely on social media to recruit new members. After the 
hypothesis is reviewed, counterterrorism recommendations are offered that can 
potentially degrade the effectiveness of violent extremist groups’ online recruiting 
strategies. The final area of this chapter offers future areas of study that would likely 
increase the limited amount of empirical data that explains the effectiveness of violent 
extremist groups’ new media recruiting strategies. 
A. HYPOTHESIS ANALYSIS 
Violent extremist groups employ a diversified recruiting strategy. Loraine Ali 
calls it a “multi-platform” recruiting strategy.193  This strategy utilizes several new media 
technologies—passive websites, active blogs, interactive social media, mobile devices, 
and online gaming—to project a large online presence and overwhelming success. 
Projecting a large online presence inflates violent extremist groups’ online personas, 
portrays them as being popular, and thereby attracts attention and new media users 
toward violent extremist groups.194 
Because of the vast number of websites that violent extremist groups maintain, 
websites provide violent extremist groups with the ability to project a large online 
presence. Websites also allow violent extremist groups to publicize recruiting 
propaganda, which is used to influence new media users’ beliefs and behavior. Through 
websites, groups generate online attention and thereby attract potential recruits. 
Although websites play an important role in projecting success and recruiting new 
members, they represent a passive component to violent extremist groups’ recruiting 
strategies because they passively wait for online users. By incorporating interactive Web 
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2.0 technologies, violent extremist groups can recruit actively rather than wait for users to 
visit websites. 
Blogs and social media are key components of violent extremist groups’ active 
recruiting strategies. Blogs inadvertently assist violent extremist groups in narrowcasting 
their propaganda, and they allow them to identify trending or popular online topics. 
Because they center on specific issues, blogs sort audiences by demographic, sex, 
religion, or a host of other factors. Once audiences are narrowed by blog topic, violent 
extremist groups can interact with audiences, gather preferences, and narrowcast 
propaganda toward these focused audiences. 
Because blog sites identify trending or popular online topics, violent extremist 
groups can manipulate propaganda to align with these popular issues. By linking 
propaganda to popular topics or hiding propaganda behind related titles, violent extremist 
groups benefit from the large amount of attention and activity that blogs generate. By 
hiding propaganda behind misleading titles, violent extremist groups can entice bloggers 
to follow links to propaganda or interact unknowingly with violent extremists. 
Facebook is the most popular social media venue online.195 Within social media, 
users produce and consume an enormous amount of videos, movies, audio clips, and 
several other types of media. Violent extremist groups also produce vast quantities of 
propaganda and utilize overt and surreptitious recruiting tactics when discussing or 
disseminating propaganda throughout social media networks. 
Some propaganda is obvious.  It contains images of violence, logos from violent 
extremist groups, or is directly attributable to violent extremist groups. Other propaganda 
is less obvious.  It portrays members as humanitarian aid workers or helping the poor.196 
Regardless of tactic, and similar to blogs, social media allows violent extremist groups to 
observe and interact with vast numbers of social media users, publicize propaganda, and 
project a huge online presence throughout globally distributed social media networks. 
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Because social media is easy to use and involves expansive audiences, violent extremist 
groups have fully incorporated it into recruiting strategies.197 Since social media attracts 
enormous and networked audiences, violent extremist groups push their members to 
exploit social media to its fullest.198 
Mobile phones and smart phones are another new media technology that allows 
violent extremist groups to interact with vast and globally distributed audiences. Similar 
to social media, violent extremist groups exploit smartphone applications, such as 
Twitter, by publishing large amounts of tweets or titling propaganda after popular topics. 
Violent extremist groups create large amounts of propaganda and quickly distribute it 
through mobile phones. This propaganda contributes to groups’ global images and 
overwhelming popularity. 
Smartphones provide encrypted communications.199 By using smartphones, 
violent extremist groups can communicate with each other and throughout social media 
networks via secure communications. Although counterterrorism organizations may 
confiscate them, smartphones are encrypted, and the encryption is difficult to break. By 
using smartphones, violent extremist groups can communicate securely throughout 
globally connected social media networks. 
In another new media technology, online gaming connects over a billion new 
media users.200 Since these games attract huge numbers of networked players, violent 
extremist groups have expanded recruiting efforts to exploit their overwhelming 
popularity. By producing video games that mirror other popular games, violent extremist 
groups attract attention in a manner similar to exploiting trending topics. By 
incorporating another new media technology that projects popularity, online gaming 
creates attention for violent extremist groups throughout vast gamer networks and 
thereby increases the potential for recruiting new members. 
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Al Qaeda and ISIS have both incorporated social media networks into their 
communication structures. Both groups also employ diverse new media technologies in 
their recruiting strategies—broadcast and narrowcast to recruit new members. 
Al Qaeda’s message is broadcasted through several new media technologies, but 
it narrowcasts predominantly toward Muslims. The group’s message calls for attacks on 
non-Muslims. ISIS also broadcasts and narrowcasts, but its broadcast message is twofold. 
First, ISIS portrays acts of terrorism as a legitimate use of force and uses propaganda to 
threaten opponents.201 Second, ISIS broadly invites anyone to join them and their 
success. When narrowcasting, ISIS portrays membership as “fulfilling” and “fun,” so the 
group focuses propaganda on new media users searching for sources of satisfaction or 
entertainment. 
Throughout this thesis, several examples illustrated how al Qaeda and ISIS utilize 
several new media technologies to attract attention and recruit throughout vast and 
networked new media audiences. Therefore, violent extremist groups rely on social 
media to recruit new members, and they exploit several new media technologies to reach 
broad audiences. Additionally, groups focus propaganda to exploit the popularity of 
trending topics or craft propaganda to appeal to individual preferences. 
B. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
In a study consisting of over 40 YouTube channels, the majority of channels were 
maintained in Europe, but they were legally based in the United States.202 Basing 
channels within the United States grants new media users U.S. Constitutional rights such 
as freedom of speech and protection from unreasonable search and seizure that can 
negatively impact counterterrorism efforts and further complicate these efforts because of 
the international relations implications. 
U.S. citizens may express their freedom of speech by publicizing and 
disseminating propaganda. If, however, counterterrorism agencies wish to curtail 
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propaganda dissemination and online recruiting, they must coordinate with federal 
agencies to link individuals with known terrorist groups and prove that individuals or 
groups have overstepped First Amendment rights—freedom of speech. 
In al Qaeda’s and ISIS’ communication structure, individuals in the middle tier 
play an important intermediary role by forwarding the centrally produced propaganda to 
the flat portions of the structure. Assuming that counterterrorism organizations and 
personnel can identify these middle tier individuals and can work within the legal 
framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, they are able to obtain the proper 
warrants to collect information on these individuals without infringing upon Fourth 
Amendment rights—unreasonable search and seizure.203 Having identified these middle-
tier individuals, counterterrorism agencies can work with the proper law enforcement 
organizations to highlight individuals and limit their online activity. 
The U.S. State Department is the authority for determining whether an 
organization is considered terrorist-related or not. By coordinating with the U.S. State 
Department, counterterrorism agencies can link these middle-tier individuals to known 
terrorist organizations, which affords counterterrorism groups latitude to further highlight 
connections within violent extremist group communication networks and identify 
individuals within the upper and lower levels. Furthermore, it is incumbent upon 
counterterrorism organizations to educate legislators on the passive versus active aspects 
of violent extremist groups’ new media recruiting strategies. 
C. FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
This thesis reviewed how al Qaeda and ISIS both narrowcast propaganda, but 
specific research surrounding narrowcasting techniques and intended audiences is 
warranted to determine whether diversified recruiting strategies are effective. Throughout 
research for this thesis, several examples emerged indicating that violent extremist groups 
narrowcasted toward specific audiences—women, teens, young men, the poor, or the 
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disenfranchised. Within each group, research can potentially identify specific 
characteristics to determine if an overall trend emerges across multiple groups. If 
trending data can be determined, research can potentially identify individuals or groups 
that may be more susceptible to violent extremist groups’ recruiting propaganda. 
Additional research can also focus on how violent extremist groups narrowcast 
toward specific individuals. Although various recruiting strategies may or may not apply 
universally, determining if violent extremist groups narrowcast toward individuals may 
help identify the process of moving individuals from virtual recruiting environments into 
physical contact and communication. 
Furthermore, in an effort to counter violent extremist groups’ new media 
recruiting strategies, some counterterrorism agencies maintain websites or publish 
various messages via new media technologies. Rohan Gunaratna says that these efforts 
are often “boring” because counterterrorism campaigns are not visually appealing and 
messages are inconsistent across multiple agencies.204 If counterterrorism strategies wish 
to gain some semblance of parity with violent extremist groups’ new media recruiting 
strategies, they must produce high-quality messages that are relevant to online audiences 
and resonate within diverse groups. Additionally, these messages must be distributable 
via several new media technologies. 
In a final option for additional study, one may focus on the transition from virtual 
recruitment to actual physical contact. As an example, ISIS’ virtual supporters recruited 
four brothers online. Prior to their secretive departure to Syria, the boys’ father observed 
an unknown man talking to them face-to-face in their front yard.205 Does online 
recruiting still require face-to-face interaction? What is the process that moves new media 
users from a virtual environment to actual membership? 
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